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One of the many attractive features of Adrian Moore’s magisterial work, The 
Evolution of Modern Metaphysics, is its insistence that metaphysics at its best is a 
creative and even playful undertaking, a matter of attempting to make general 
sense of things in novel and unexpected ways.  Responding to all sorts of 
philosophical pressures, metaphysicians create concepts that reorganize our 
theoretical practices, provide us with new critical standpoints, and directly or 
indirectly alter the way we live.  At first glance, Moore’s definition of metaphysics 
as ‘the most general attempt to make sense of things’ (p. 1) may seem suspect.  
Surely, one might think, theologians or theoretical physicists have as good a claim 
to be engaged on just such an attempt. But for Moore this is already a 
metaphysical question. What forms sense making can take, and whether they are 
really available to us, are among the issues that metaphysicians consider.  Probing 
the first, they have asked whether our most general efforts at sense-making can 
only encompass immanent things or can also extend to transcendent ones (p. 9).  
Reflecting on the second, they have wondered whether our sense-making itself is 
transcendent.  Do we stand outside the natural order and bring sense to it? Or 
does it make sense independently of us, as naturalists are inclined to believe (pp. 
145-50)?  
According to Moore, the creative efforts of modern metaphysicians have 
focused on these two strands of enquiry.  But their investigations have not 
proceeded smoothly and their conclusions have not been cumulative.  Since the 
early years of the seventeenth century, metaphysics has been punctuated by 
three revolutionary innovations, each of which Moore compares to a figure ‘X’. 
Like the crossover point of its two lines, these innovations ‘draw together the 
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various strands above it and issue in those below’ (p. 107).  One such moment is 
exemplified by the work of Descartes, whose status as the first modern 
philosopher derives from his novel claim that the way to make the most general 
sense of things is to reflect critically on his 0wn heritage ‘and to ask, using no 
other resources than are available to him from that position of critical reflection, 
what entitles him to draw on that heritage in the ways in which he does’ (p. 27).  
The next ‘extraordinary thing’ that redirects metaphysical exploration is the 
transformation wrought by Kant, ensuring as it does that ‘what has gone before 
and what will come after are both largely to be understood in terms of [his 
metaphysics]’ (p. 107). A third equally momentous shift occurs when Deleuze 
takes ‘philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular in all sorts of new 
directions’ by ‘releasing forces at work in his predecessors’ (p. 542).1  
 If, as this account implies, metaphysics periodically rewrites its own 
history, the fate and significance of any particular figure will always stand to be 
reassessed. Someone whose work has been seen as marginal under one 
dispensation may acquire a new centrality under the next, or vice versa. Among 
the figures whose fortunes have varied over time is Spinoza, who initially enters 
Moore’s drama as a forthright though indebted critic of Descartes.  Where 
Descartes separated the transcendent mind from the material body, Spinoza 
conceived human minds as immanent in God or nature.  Where Descartes asked 
how the human mind can make sense of the physical world by accurately 
representing it, Spinoza saw human beings as parts of a physical world that 
already makes sense, and as participants in nature’s sense-making. Where 
Descartes viewed metaphysics as a means to scientific understanding, Spinoza 
regarded it as an integral part of ethics, a kind of sense-making that we need to 
undertake if we are to become capable of living as well as human nature will 
allow.  And where Descartes’ good life revolved around the cautious avoidance of 
error, Spinoza’s is an ethic of affirmation and empowerment.  
                                                        
1 Moore would presumably agree that the radical implications of Deleuze’s work have not 
yet been fully absorbed, and indeed, one of his aims may be help this process along.  
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After this opening scene, however, Spinoza disappears into the wings.  He briefly 
reappears in order to be criticized by Fichte and Hegel,2 but it is not until the plot 
turns to the non-analytic traditions of the late modern period that his role really 
picks up.  The first hint of this change comes in Nietzsche’s famous postcard: ‘I am 
utterly amazed, utterly enchanted.  I have a precursor, and what a precursor! Not 
only is [Spinoza’s] over-all tendency like mine – making knowledge the most 
powerful affect – but in five main points of his doctrine I recognize myself …’ (p. 
397).  Nietzsche’s enthusiastic embrace is motivated by his commitment to a kind 
of metaphysics that shares many Spinozist features - an immanent and ethical 
undertaking in which there is no place for a personal God.  But although he 
delightedly claims Spinoza as a precursor when writing to Overbeck, he does not 
acknowledge him in his published writings, so that in Moore’s narrative it is only 
in  the work of Deleuze that Spinoza steps into the limelight.   
Deleuze explains his approach to the history of philosophy via a blatantly 
masculine sexual metaphor.  ‘I saw myself as taking an author from behind and 
giving him a child that would be his own offspring, yet monstrous.’  While the 
author is not entirely passive  - he ‘had to actually say all that I had him saying’  - 
Deleuze’s aim is nevertheless to produce something new and dissonant, the result 
of  ‘all sorts of shifting, slipping, dislocations and hidden emissions that I really 
enjoyed’ (p. 544).  While Deleuze  couples with many metaphysicians, the 
presiding geniuses of his own philosophical outlook are Spinoza, Nietzsche and 
Bergson.  Taking account of the way Nietzsche reads Spinoza, and throwing in the 
Bergsonian distinction between the virtual and the actual, he constructs a 
Deleuzian tradition that begins with Spinoza and culminates in his distinctive 
philosophy.  Like Spinoza, he rejects the transcendent (pp. 566-7); like Spinoza, 
he holds that making metaphysical sense of things is empowering; and like 
Spinoza, he takes it that empowering ourselves brings about an ethical 
transformation that is to some extent ineffable.  
                                                        
2 On Moore’s assessment of the philosophical relations between Spinoza and Hegel see 
the article by Robert Stern in this volume. 
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Looking back over Moore’s book, we thus confront an overarching 
argument that runs from Spinoza, rather than from Descartes, to Deleuze.  The 
Spinoza who first enters as a critic of Cartesianism becomes the progenitor of the 
most recent  ‘extraordinary thing’ in the history of metaphysics. Spinoza’s 
insights, shocking to many of his contemporaries and neglected by generations of 
his successors, eventually result in an innovative outlook that offers us a new way 
to make sense of things and at the same time alters what we can do.  As our 
metaphysical understanding grows, we extend our capacity to live affirmatively.  
Opposing ‘everything that takes pleasure in the powerlessness and distress of 
men, … everything that breaks men’s spirits’ (p. 45), we become, as Deleuze puts 
it, ‘more worthy of what happens to us’ (p. 567). 
For Moore, then, the most consequential feature of Spinoza’s philosophy 
within the history of modern metaphysics turns out to be its claim that 
metaphysics can enable us to lead more affirmative and satisfying lives.  The 
project of making the most general sense of things, as Spinoza conceives it, 
somehow enhances our practical capacity to avoid sadness and become more 
joyful and resilient.  But how are these two things connected? What is 
metaphysics, in Spinoza’s view, and how does it contribute to this ethical 
transformation?  Moore handles these questions with characteristic learning and 
clarity; but I shall nevertheless suggest that his answers fail to do justice to 
Spinoza’s rich account of the different ways in which we make sense, and the 
interconnections between them.  Where Moore claims that Spinoza regards 
metaphysics as the fruit of reasoning, and thus as a species of what is labelled in 
the Ethics as knowledge of the second kind, I shall argue that metaphysics also 
belongs with what Spinoza calls imagining or knowledge of the first kind.  And 
where Moore holds that, in order to render metaphysical knowledge practical, 
one must take a leap to a kind of knowledge that is partly ineffable (so-called 
knowledge of the third kind), I shall argue that each of the thee kinds of 
knowledge, including metaphysics, is practically oriented.   
Given the formidable scale of Moore’s The Evolution of Modern 
Metaphysics, these are minor suggested amendments, with which he may have 
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some sympathy (64-5).  My aim is not so much to challenge his interpretation, as 
to explore how far a definition of metaphysics that is designed to apply to four 
hundred years’ worth of philosophizing captures the character of metaphysics as 
Spinoza conceives of it.3  Moore’s emphasis on metaphysics as a name for our 
attempts to make the most general sense of things certainly resonates within 
Spinoza’s Ethics.   However, so I shall argue, it fails to answer to Spinoza’s view 
that our essence as human beings lies in our striving to persevere in our being, 
and to his insistence that this conatus is manifested in everything we do. In 
philosophizing – and so in doing metaphysics - we are striving to empower 
ourselves.  To understand what makes metaphysics distinctive and valuable we 
therefore need to appreciate how it makes us more powerful, and what it 
contributes to the ethical transformation that philosophizing ultimately yields.      
Where, then, does metaphysics fit into Spinoza’s philosophical system?  
How does he conceive of our attempts to make the most general sense of things, 
and how does he think that these attempts empower us?  Moore’s reply focuses 
on Spinoza’s claim that there are three kinds of knowledge.  As Moore explains 
this view, we acquire knowledge of the first kind ‘whenever something impinges 
on somebody from without, as for example when a man enjoys an ordinary sense 
perception or is given a piece of information by someone else’ (58). Because 
knowledge of this kind does not lie within our own control but depends on the 
way that external things affect us, Spinoza describes the ideas it yields as 
inadequate.  The information they give us about external things is partial and 
                                                        
3 In the Ethics, the term appears once, in the Appendix to Part I, where Spinoza refers to 
‘theologians and metaphysicians’ who distinguish between an end of need and an end of 
assimilation (II/80).  However, Spinoza also appends an Appendix Containing 
Metaphysical Thoughts to his reconstruction of Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy.  Here 
he says that the general part of metaphysics concerns being and its affections (I/233), 
and adds that angels are a subject for theology but not for metaphysics (I/275).  Writing 
to Blyenbergh in 1665, he remarks that a proof of ethics ‘must be founded on 
metaphysics’ (IV/160) and that  ‘the necessity of things concerns metaphysics, the 
knowledge of which must always come first’ (IV/161).  References here are to Spinoza, 
Opera ed. Carl Gebhardt, 4 vols. (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1924).  Gebhardt’s volume and 
page numbers are included in Edwin Curley ed., The Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. I 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).  I have used Curley’s translations 
throughout. 
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sometimes distorted. Knowledge of the first kind is duly contrasted with a second 
kind, reasoning, that escapes this form of dependence, because it consists in what 
Spinoza calls adequate ideas, which express their own reason for being true 
(EIIp.41).  As Moore puts it, ‘Just by carefully attending to one of our adequate 
ideas … we can see it as true, because we can see it as explained by reasons which 
it itself expresses.’  (59).  It is important to Moore’s argument that this sort of 
knowledge deals in generalities. Whereas knowledge of the first kind gives us, for 
example, inadequate ideas of particular bodies such as this star or that neighbour, 
knowledge of the second kind gives us adequate ideas of bodies in general.  
But this contrast in turn prompts the question of whether we can have adequate 
knowledge of particular things, and this is where knowledge of the third kind 
comes in.  This sort of knowledge proceeds, in Spinoza’s view, from an adequate 
idea of the attributes of substance to an adequate idea of the essences of 
[particular] things (EIIp40s2).4  Once again, it focuses on particulars rather than 
on types of things.  
Since metaphysical enquiry is, by definition, our attempt to make the most 
general sense of things, Moore infers that metaphysics as Spinoza conceives of it 
must qualify as knowledge of the second kind.  ‘Metaphysics is the most general 
attempt to make sense of things.  In Spinoza’s terms, it is the most general pursuit 
of knowledge of the second kind,’ and must therefore map the relations between 
general ideas (64).  There is evidently much that is right about this claim; 
Spinoza’s Ethics offers us insights into the natural order of which we are a part.  It 
purports, for example, to give us adequate ideas of substance and some of its 
attributes, from which all our other general ideas flow.   However, it is not so clear 
that all our efforts to make the most general sense of things qualify as knowledge 
of the second kind.  Since knowledge of the first kind also offers us general 
interpretations of things, there is at least a prima facie case for the view that 
metaphysics may not fall neatly into a single category but be spread, as it were, 
across two kinds of knowledge.  To explore this possibility, and assess Moore’s 
                                                        
4  References to the Ethics are given in the standard form.  
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claim, we therefore need to look in more detail at Spinoza’s account of ‘knowledge 
of the first kind, opinion or imagination’ (EIIp40s2).  
According to Spinoza, every human being has some physical power to 
move and some corresponding mental power to think; and each of us uses these 
powers, both to maintain ourselves as the beings we are and, where possible, to 
make ourselves more powerful and resilient (55). Furthermore, because our 
conatus or striving to persevere in our being is our essence, it is always in 
operation (EIIIp7).  It is manifested, for example, in the workings of our bodies, in 
our actions, and in our thinking.  Among the resources with which we strive to 
persevere in our being are, therefore, the ideas of the way that external things 
affect us that form the basis of knowledge of the first kind.  When Jane sees an 
Alsatian dog, for example, she has an idea of a growling and frightening animal; 
but rather than merely receiving it, she strives with it.  She affirms that there is 
indeed a frightening dog in front of her (EIIp17), and this idea in turn motivates 
her to act, perhaps by getting out of its way. Her idea of the dog therefore feeds 
into her efforts to persevere in her being and is reflected in her everyday attempt 
to make sense of the world. 
In the Ethics, Spinoza explores the ways in which imagination or 
knowledge of this first kind is, when judged by philosophical standards, 
epistemologically unreliable It is grounded, he tells us, on sensory perceptions 
that have been represented to us in ways that are ‘mutilated, confused and 
without order for the intellect’ (EII p40s2). However, these ideas nevertheless 
form the basis of our everyday knowledge of the world and underlie our attempts 
to make general sense of it. As we strive to persevere in our being, we use the 
ideas that imagination delivers to form universal notions, arrive at inductive 
generalisations about the behaviour of types of things, and classify situations as 
more or less likely to be satisfying. To be sure, many of our judgments are 
relatively specific, as for example when we try to work out whether Alsatian dogs 
are usually dangerous; but we also press forward towards greater generality, 
formulating universal claims about what exists or what human beings can do. 
Insofar as we proceed in this fashion we remain in the realm of the inadequate 
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ideas that constitute knowledge of the first kind; but our enquiries nevertheless 
seem to constitute an attempt to make the most general sense of things, and thus 
seem to qualify, according to Moore’s definition, as metaphysical.  Why should we 
not conclude, then, that some metaphysics is knowledge of the first kind? 
Spinoza himself is perfectly willing to accept this view. His objection to 
knowledge of the first kind is not that it fails to attempt to make the most general 
sense of things (and thus excludes the kinds of enquiries we classify as 
metaphysical), but rather that the metaphysics it produces is usually mistaken. 
Because knowledge of the first kind is unreliable, its flaws tend to be transmitted 
to the metaphysical outlooks that it yields, so that, like the ideas that go into them, 
they are inadequate, distorted or mutilated.  However, in order to criticise the 
metaphysical fruits of imagining in these terms, we must first have understood 
the processes through which they have arisen and the epistemological limitations 
to which these processes are subject.  While imagining itself can set us on this 
path (it is, after all, possible to imagine well or badly), it cannot in Spinoza’s view 
guarantee that we will not continue to make the kinds of mistakes that we are 
setting out to criticise.  Fortunately, knowledge of the second kind offers us a 
purportedly foolproof way of guaranteeing the truth of our ideas, including the 
metaphysical positions we have arrived at by way of imagining.  It provides us 
with a means to make the most general sense of things that is also true, and a 
means to unmask ways of making the most general sense that fall short of this 
standard.   
In the Ethics Spinoza aspires to reveal, from the standpoint of the second 
kind of knowledge, both how imagining works, and how it produces misleading 
metaphysical outlooks.  Dwelling on the first issue, he identifies two major 
epistemological limitations of imagining, both fuelled by the working of our 
conatus.  The first has its source in the ideas on which imagining rests.  As we 
have seen, these are ideas of the way external things affect us, and in Spinoza’s 
view they say more about our own bodies than the external things concerned 
(EIIp17c). But this is not how they strike us.  Taking them to represent the 
external world as it is, we generate all sorts of misconceptions, some empirical, 
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others normative.  Illustrating the empirical errors to which imagining exposes 
us, Spinoza notes that the sun appears to be quite near the earth. Moreover, 
unless some reason for doubt arises, an observer will affirm this idea and wrongly 
conclude that the perception is veridical (EIIp35s). Explaining how we go 
normatively astray, he focuses on our passions.  Someone who is afraid of an 
Alsatian, for example, is liable to suppress the fact that their fear arises from the 
way the animal affects them, and view the dog itself as inherently frightening.  
A second epistemological limitation of imagining stems from the way we 
use our everyday, inadequate ideas to persevere in our being.  Sometimes these 
efforts are well-judged, as for example when we co-operate with other people to 
acquire useful skills. But our striving is also coloured by a disposition to imagine 
ourselves as powerful, and sometimes as more powerful than we are (EIIp12, 
p13).  Interpreting the world in the light of our desires, we conceive of ourselves 
as the possessors of powers that we would like to have, or represent nature as we 
would like it to be. In our efforts to make sense, we blend reality with fiction and, 
letting our desires run ahead of us, imagine a world adapted to promote our ends 
(EIApp.).  
According to Spinoza, these two imaginative dispositions are reflected in 
some of the most basic cognitive habits from which our metaphysical conclusions 
are derived, including our tendency to produce general definitions by comparing 
individual things.  General terms are a central component of our attempts to make 
general sense of things; but while we think of ourselves as forming them by 
soberly investigating the properties of particulars, this is not the way we 
ordinarily go on.  In many cases, our definitions are shaped by our desires and 
reflect our imagined ideals. They are, as Spinoza puts it, models or exemplars.  
However, instead of recognizing this fact, we take it that they accurately capture 
the way things are.  For example, in forming a universal notion of a human being 
we compare individuals, focus on traits that we should like humans to possess, 
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treat these features as essential, and impose the resulting model on a less 
satisfying reality (EIVPref.). 5 
Spinoza discusses a number of cases where our attempts to do 
metaphysics go awry because the ideas to which they appeal reflect one or other 
of these distorting imaginative dispositions.  A first example focuses directly on 
the way we construct general terms.  As we have seen, Spinoza argues that our 
universal terms are prone to reflect our ideas of things as we would like them to 
be, and answer to our notions of perfection  For example, we might form a 
universal notion of a human being as the possessor of a whole range of 
perfections such as sight, rationality and virtue.   But when we judge individuals 
against this standard (for example when we judge a blind man against such a 
model) we often find them lacking; and this in turn encourages us to arrive at 
what Spinoza regards as the profoundly mistaken view that there are imperfect 
individuals in nature.6  Moreover, once armed with the conviction that particular 
things have varying degrees of perfection, we are led into various metaphysical 
debates.  Does God make imperfect individuals or not?  Does he or does he not 
have the power to do otherwise?  Does he or does he not condemn us to sin? 
Failing to appreciate that the universal notion of a human being on which these 
discussions rest is a mere ‘notion of thinking’ for which we ourselves are 
responsible, we struggle to make sense of the relationship between God and 
humanity.7  
A comparable story can be told about a second of our metaphysical 
misconceptions, this time the belief that we have free will.  Although we know 
very little about the causes of our actions, Spinoza argues, our disposition to 
conceive ourselves as more powerful than we are inclines us to locate these 
causes in ourselves, and to endow ourselves with a two-way power to act or 
refrain from acting.  Taking at face value our phenomenological sense that 
                                                        
5 A. Wolf ed., The Correspondence of Spinoza (London: Frank Cass, 1966). Letter 19 to 
Blyenbergh 1665. 
6 Wolf ed. Correspondence of Spinoza, Letter 19 to Blyenbergh 1665. 
7 Wolf ed. Correspondence of Spinoza, Letters 19 and 20 to Blyenbergh 1665. 
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whether or not we act is up to us, and turning our face against the possibility that 
other causal factors may be involved, we portray ourselves as the natural 
possessors of a level of autonomy that is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
achieve (EIIIp2s(ii); EIIp35s).  Once again, an idea that has its roots in 
imagination has a deleterious effect on our attempts to do metaphysics, this time 
by encouraging us to suppose that, by virtue of free will, we stand apart from the 
rest of nature, and thus that making sense of ourselves will be a separate project 
from making sense of other kinds of thing.   
A last example of imaginative metaphysics focuses on our ideas of God. As 
we have seen, the operations of our conatus sometimes prompt us to project our 
desire to be powerful, and in Spinoza’s view this mechanism is at work when we 
form anthropomorphic ideas of the deity. (As he wryly remarks in a letter to 
Boxel, this disposition runs deep; if a triangle could talk, it would say that God is 
triangular.)8  At one level, images of a quasi-human deity arise from our desire to 
empower ourselves by understanding the world, and in particular by grasping the 
nature of its first cause.  At another level, we make our images of the deity answer 
to our desire to be cared for by imagining a God who is loving and benevolent. At 
yet another level, we attempt to satisfy our yearning for a security that human 
polities cannot fully provide, by representing God as the author of a law that 
binds everyone and endows us all with certain rights and duties.  Moreover, 
because these are the conceptions of God with which we try to make the most 
general sense of things, they shape – and limit – metaphysics (EIApp.).   
As these three cases attest, the inadequacy of our ideas does not stop us 
from doing metaphysics.  Working with whatever ideas they have, people form 
universal notions and use them to make the most general sense of things that 
they can.  Moreover, because they usually have very little knowledge of the 
second kind and live mainly within the confines of imagination, most of the 
metaphysics that has so far been produced is knowledge of the first kind.  As the 
Ethics sets out to show, it suffers from the epistemological limitations to which 
                                                        
8 Wolf ed., Correspondence of Spinoza, Letter 56 to Boxel, 1674. 
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imagining makes us vulnerable, and the claims it advances are either partly or 
comprehensively mistaken. (In Spinoza’s view there are no imperfect individuals 
in nature; we do not have free will; and there is no anthropomorphic God.) 
However, unsatisfactory as they may be, these claims are nonetheless 
metaphysical ones, a series of flawed attempts to make the most general sense of 
things.  
Since Moore intends his definition of metaphysics to ‘cover as much as 
possible of what self-styled metaphysicians have been up to’(6), I suspect that he 
will agree with this conclusion, while pointing out that this is not how Spinoza 
sees his own metaphysics. Unlike the work of his predecessors, so Spinoza 
believes, his metaphysics has the advantage of being free from imaginative 
projection and distortion and, as the Ethics is meant to demonstrate, guarantees 
its own truth.  Being knowledge of the second kind, arrived at by the process that 
Spinoza describes as reasoning, it is epistemologically superior to its competitors. 
But is it also more general than the metaphysical outlooks it is intended to 
surpass?  Does Spinoza think of his own metaphysics not only as making truer 
sense than the systems developed by earlier philosophers, but also as making 
more general sense than they do? There is inevitably something less than 
completely general about the ideas that form the basis of knowledge of the first 
kind. Jane’s ideas of Alsatians, for example, are ideas of the way in which 
particular dogs have affected her particular body, and when she uses these ideas 
to form a universal notion of an Alsatian it will reflect the limits of her experience 
(58-9).  Because it is grounded on partial evidence, this idea will be incomplete 
and perhaps to some degree distorted; and the same applies to any notions 
formed in this way with which we go on to do metaphysics.  The great advantage 
of knowledge of the second kind, as Spinoza portrays it, is that it offers a way to 
overcome the particularity of our individual or collective experience. By starting 
from common notions or true ideas that are in principle accessible to everyone, 
and proceeding to the ideas that they express or are expressed by, we can arrive 
at an understanding of a comprehensive framework of necessary truths (61).  In 
place of the experientially based ideas that imagination affords us, we can 
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formulate general terms that are genuinely universal and reflect the essences of 
things.  
Knowledge of the second kind therefore yields conclusions of a scope or 
generality that imagining cannot provide; but there is also a further sense in 
which the kind of sense it enables us to make is maximally general.  The truths 
that Spinoza claims to reveal through reasoning abolish a range of categorical 
distinctions such as those between God and nature, nature and man, or mind and 
body, and override the suggestion, routinely endorsed by other metaphysicians, 
that we might need to make sense of these things in different ways.  As Moore 
points out, the Ethics proposes that we can make sense of everything, including 
ourselves and our sense-making, in one way REF.  So in this respect, too, 
knowledge of the second kind offers us a form of understanding that is 
completely comprehensive or completely general.   
Moore is therefore surely right that Spinoza regards himself as having 
identified a second kind of knowledge that enables us to make sense of things in a 
fashion more general than any conceived by his predecessors, and presents his 
own metaphysical conclusions as instances of knowledge of this kind.  However, 
before we close with this judgment, we need to pause to consider whether 
knowledge of the second kind may not continue to rely on the workings of 
imagination. Perhaps, despite the power he attributes to reasoning, Spinoza’s 
metaphysics remains a little imaginary, and therefore straddles the boundary 
between the first and second kinds of knowledge. 
We get a first hint of how this might be so from the Tractatus Theologico-
Philosophicus, where Spinoza implicitly discusses the relation between two ways 
of gaining knowledge that early modern philosophers describe as analysis and 
synthesis. In the Ethics, Spinoza’s method is broadly synthetic; he states some 
premises and shows what follows from them. In the Tractatus, by contrast, he 
considers how we arrive at the premises from which reasoning proceeds, and 
allows that we often get to them by generalizing from experience.  This, for 
example, is one way to formulate general definitions, such as those of motion and 
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rest (TTP II/102).9  As this example reminds us, knowledge of the first kind is not 
invariably subject to the distorting flaws we have discussed, and when used with 
caution can produce ideas that are taken up into knowledge of the second kind.  
Imagining and reasoning work hand in hand, the first supplying materials for the 
second, and together contributing to our efforts to make the most general sense 
of things.  
Perhaps Moore will reply that ideas only becomes general enough to be 
counted as metaphysical when they have been vindicated by reasoning.  For 
example, a definition of motion, however arrived at, only becomes integral to 
Spinoza’s metaphysical attempt to make the most general sense of things once it 
has been shown to express and be expressed by other adequate ideas, and thus to 
be adequate itself.  I agree with Moore that Spinoza imagines a comprehensive 
philosophical system that answers to this description, and aspires to outline some 
of it in the Ethics, where many of the key ideas on which he relies are purportedly 
adequate and constitute knowledge of the second kind. However, we need to 
remember that very few of our ideas are completely adequate, and that adequacy 
comes in degrees.  For example, a student of geometry starts out with an 
inadequate idea of a triangle, which becomes more adequate as she understands 
more of its properties. Spinoza himself does not have an entirely adequate idea of 
God, although he does have adequate ideas of some divine attributes, thought and 
extension.10   We have only a hazy or inadequate idea of the human body: ‘We do 
not know what the body can do’ (EIIIp25; EIIp29s). Furthermore, since body and 
mind are in Spinoza’s view one and the same thing, our idea of the human mind 
will be correspondingly inadequate (EIIp21).  
Should a philosopher respond to this state of affairs by theorizing only 
with completely adequate ideas and refusing to have anything to do with the rest?  
Ideally, yes.  But Spinoza acknowledges the impracticality of such an approach 
                                                        
9 Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise ed. M. Silverthorne and J. Israel (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). The reference is to Gebhardt’s volume and page 
number, which are included in Silverthorne and Israel’s edition.  
10 Wolf ed., Correspondence of Spinoza, Letter 56 to Boxel 1674.  
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and allows that, in order to pursue the project of making the most general sense 
of things, we must be willing to work with ideas that are only partly adequate, 
and must therefore move back and forth across the border between the first and 
second kinds of knowledge.  
Consider, for example, Spinoza’s claim that figure is not an intrinsic feature 
of a body, but simply a way of describing the way one body limits another. ‘For he 
who says that he apprehends a figure wants to express thereby nothing else than 
that he is apprehending a limited thing, and how it is limited.  The limitation, 
therefore, does not belong to the thing in virtue of its being’.11  This being so, one 
might expect Spinoza to avoid any appeal to the figures of bodies in the course of 
the Ethics; but in fact he takes another course. The study of geometrical figures 
provides the exemplary case of knowledge of the second kind.  Furthermore, 
Spinoza’s discussion of physical principles in Part II of the Ethics includes a 
description of the way that bodies of different sizes ‘lie upon one another’ 
(EIIA2’’Dftn.).  Here Spinoza seems to acknowledge that a partly inadequate idea 
of a body has a role to play in the construction of a comprehensive philosophical 
account of nature.  Rather than censoring our disposition to imagine bodies as 
possessing figures, we shall do better – at least for the time being – to make 
cautious use of it as we develop an increasingly adequate knowledge of bodies 
and their behavior.  
Spinoza also takes a comparable approach to the notions of good and evil.  
We form these notions, he explains, by comparing one thing with another, and 
although we often take good and evil to be intrinsic properties of objects or states 
of affairs, they do not in fact indicate anything positive in things themselves.  They 
are merely modes of thinking or inadequate ideas that arise from our own 
imaginings (EIVPref.).  Since they are inadequate, Spinoza should ideally refrain 
from using them in philosophical contexts; but again, his strategy is not so 
straightforward. ‘Because we desire to form an idea of man, as a model of human 
nature that we may look to’, it will be ‘useful for us to retain these words’.  It will 
                                                        
11  Wolf ed., Correspondence of Spinoza, Letter 50 to Jelles 1674.  
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be useful, that is, to imagine a human being who has all the traits we regard as 
good, and to describe anything that enables us to become more like this model as 
good in itself.  For example, if co-operating with other people helps us to achieve 
this end, we are justified in describing it as good in itself, despite the fact that, 
since goodness is not an intrinsic property of co-operation, a certain amount of 
ontological distortion is involved.  
Cases such as these suggest that, as we strive to develop a maximally 
general type of understanding, we are simultaneously tethered and empowered 
by our disposition to imagine things in ways that do not fully reflect what they 
are.  Insofar as this habit prevents us from confronting things in themselves it 
holds us back.  But it can also be metaphysically constructive. In the Ethics 
Spinoza imagines an entirely general and comprehensive way of making sense of 
things, a complete metaphysical system from which nothing escapes.  But his 
grasp of this system is partial or inadequate, and many of its aspects are more 
glimpsed than known. Moreover, in working it out, he relies on further ideas that 
are less than fully adequate, and that therefore have at least a foot in knowledge 
of the first kind.  Sometimes this device is a concession to his readers, who are 
given permission to rely on inadequate ideas to help their thinking along. (‘If you 
cannot manage to conceive of God without thinking of him as possessing a will, 
then go ahead.  Do not let this prevent you from developing as adequate an idea of 
him as you can.’12) But elsewhere Spinoza gives the same permission to himself.  
He allows himself, for example, to work with an idea of body that is only partly, or 
perhaps intermittently, adequate; and he allows himself to work with an 
imagined conception of intrinsic good.  Above all, he allows himself to work with 
an inadequate idea of metaphysics as an undertaking that falls entirely within the 
scope of the second kind of knowledge.  
If these suggestions are right, Moore’s claim that Spinoza regards 
metaphysics as a species of knowledge of the second kind can be said to reflect 
Spinoza’s aspirations.  Ideally, metaphysics should be a way of making sense of 
                                                        
12 See for example Wolf ed., Correspondence of Spinoza, Letter 20 to Blyenbergh 1665. 
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things that, being both comprehensive and true, has no use for the situated and to 
some extent provisional insights that knowledge of the first kind delivers.  Like 
Spinoza himself, however, Moore underemphasizes the extent to which 
metaphysical enquiry relies on imagination, both for a model of metaphysics that 
we can aspire to realize, and for ideas that, despite the fact that they are less than 
adequate, serve to keep our understanding on the move.13 
 By defining metaphysics as an attempt to make the most general sense of 
things, and interpreting Spinoza with this definition in mind, Moore draws our 
attention to the sense in which the second kind of knowledge is more general 
than knowledge of the first kind.  As we have seen, this is certainly one of 
Spinoza’s preoccupations, and Moore’s approach does ample justice to this aspect 
of his philosophy.  But there is also something else that this interpretation 
marginalizes. As well as arguing that the second kind of knowledge is more 
general than the first, Spinoza takes it to be more empowering.  Making the most 
general sense of things is a condition of becoming able to live joyfully and 
resiliently, and it is this feature that makes the second (and indeed the first) kind 
of knowledge so desirable.  Metaphysical understanding is not valuable in itself, 
nor is not valuable simply because it is general.  Rather, its value derives from its 
role in the transformative process of learning to lead a truly ethical life.  So how 
does metaphysics empower us?  How does it answer to our striving to become 
more powerful than we are?  
As Moore presents the matter, metaphysical knowledge is theoretical.  
Whereas imagining yields the practical knowledge with which we negotiate the 
world, and thus empowers us in many crucial ways, knowledge of the second kind 
stands back from action.  It shows us how one adequate idea of a general type of 
thing expresses other such ideas, as in a mathematical proof, and in doing so 
overturns many of our imaginatively-grounded prejudices.  It convinces us of the 
truth of our adequate ideas, thus strengthening our commitment to a certain 
metaphysical outlook. But it does not show us how to put this outlook into 
                                                        
13 Though Moore acknowledges the difficulties inherent in Spinoza’s project (64). 
 18 
practice, and thus how to generate the ethical way of life that Spinoza regards as 
the pinnacle of human power. In order to take this further step we have to 
acquire knowledge of the third kind, which proceeds,  as the Ethics puts it, from 
an adequate idea of the attributes of substance to an adequate idea of the 
essences of things (EIIp40s). As Moore explains, grasping the essence of a thing, X, 
is partly a matter of grasping what it can do, and is thus a matter of knowing ‘how 
to exploit the possibilities that X affords, if ever and whenever the opportunity 
arises’ (63).  When X is oneself, knowledge of the third kind encompasses 
knowledge of how to do what one can do, and when X is something else, it 
encompasses knowledge of how to do what one can do in co-operation with X .  In 
Moore’s view, the transition from the second to the third kind of knowledge 
involves a leap from the general to the particular, and from the theoretical to the 
practical, which cannot be wholly expressed in words (65). The hierarchy of the 
three kinds of knowledge therefore moves from the practical to the theoretical 
and back to the practical again. Metaphysics stands between two ways of making 
sense that clearly manifest our striving to become more powerful than we are; 
but we are left wondering how metaphysics itself expresses our conatus.  
Here, I think, Moore draws too clear a line between theoretical and 
practical kinds of knowledge. Lucid as his analysis is, it overlooks an important 
sense in which metaphysics also has what can fairly be described as a practical 
orientation, and contributes to our empowerment by extending what we can do.  
In order to see this, we need to focus once again on the character of the general 
terms that constitute knowledge of the second kind.  When we reason, we learn to 
see how one idea is the expression of others, and how it in turn expresses still 
further ideas. Furthermore, if reasoning is to be fruitful, the ideas that we 
investigate must be rich in what Spinoza calls causes and effects; they must 
express and be expressed by many ideas, so that the process of reasoning does 
not get bogged down but can move steadily forward. Writing to Tschirnhaus 
(after he had completed the Ethics), Spinoza explains that the fecundity of an idea 
depends on the way it is defined.  ‘In order that I may know from which idea of a 
thing, out of many, all the properties of the object may be deduced, I observe one 
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thing only, that the idea or definition of the thing should express its efficient 
cause.  For example, in order to investigate the properties of a circle, I ask 
whether from this idea of a circle, namely that it is composed of innumerable 
right angles, I can deduce all its properties … Since this is not so, I seek another, 
namely that a circle is the space which is described by a line of which one point is 
fixed, the other moveable.  Since this definition expresses the efficient cause, I 
know that I can deduce from it all the properties of a circle, etc.’14 The type of 
definition that Spinoza recommends tells us how a thing is brought about, and in 
this case how a circle is constructed.  The definition is theoretically fecund in the 
sense that it enables us to map sequences of efficient causes and effects, but it is 
also practically relevant.  It tells us how to do something, namely how to draw 
circles. To have an adequate idea of a circle is therefore, among other things, to 
know how to form one.  
If metaphysics is knowledge of the second kind and conforms to this 
pattern, the ideas in which it deals have a practical slant.  They are general ideas 
of types of things rather than ideas of particulars; but they are also ideas of how 
to bring things of a certain type about.  Needless to say, many of the causes and 
effects that Spinoza traces in the Ethics lie far beyond human power; but we 
nevertheless understand them by coming to see how they are produced by things 
that are much more powerful than we are. In some cases, moreover, seeing how 
one adequate idea expresses another is simultaneously a matter of seeing how we 
ourselves can bring about events of a certain type, as in the case of the circle. 
Knowledge of the second kind therefore illuminates a realm of activity to which 
our own activity belongs.  As we acquire it, we see how the things that we are 
capable of bringing about fit into a broader pattern of action, and our grasp of this 
pattern in turn informs our understanding of what we ourselves can do.  
Spinoza’s second kind of knowledge is therefore general, as Moore 
emphasizes, but also practical in its orientation. Furthermore, this way of viewing 
it helps us to see how, like our attempts to gain knowledge of the first and third 
                                                        
14  Wolf ed., Correspondence of Spinoza, Letter 60 to Tschirnhaus, 1675. 
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kinds, our efforts to make sense of things by acquiring adequate ideas manifest 
our conatus.  When we reason we strive to empower ourselves by understanding 
how things are brought about, and more specifically how we can bring things 
about.  Taking advantage of the epistemological clarity that this kind of thinking 
brings, we affirm what we can do.  The crucial things about metaphysics is 
therefore that, by empowering us in this way, it moves us in the direction of the 
affirmative way of life that is our greatest ethical achievement. 
 
 
 
